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“OF  SUBSTANTIAL  RELIGIOUS  IMPORTANCE”:
A CASE  FOR  A  DEFERENTIAL  APPROACH  TO
THE  MINISTERIAL  EXCEPTION
Allison H. Pope*
Closed on Sunday, you my Chick-Fil-A . . .
Follow Jesus, listen and obey
No more livin’ for the culture, we nobody’s slave
Stand up for my home . . .
I pray to God that He’ll strengthen my hand
They will think twice steppin’ onto my land
I draw the line, it’s written in the sand1
INTRODUCTION
As artist Kanye West proclaims, protection from outside influences is
essential for religious groups to maintain their identity and carry out their
mission.  The Framers of the Constitution, by enshrining the right to the
“free exercise” of religion and prohibiting the “establishment” of religion in
the First Amendment,2 sought to ensure the new federal government would
not unduly interfere with the religious lives of Americans.
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court fortified this concept of relig-
ious autonomy in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC
by adopting the “ministerial exception” doctrine, which had previously been
recognized by every United States court of appeals.3  According to this doc-
trine, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment preclude application of
employment discrimination laws “to claims concerning the employment rela-
tionship between” a “religious group” and its “ministers.”4  Because the Court
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Science in
Biology, University of Kansas, 2016.  I would like to thank my family for their never-ending
love and support, and Professor Gerard V. Bradley, Zachary Pohlman, and Jack Dahm for
their helpful comments and suggestions.  I would also like to thank my peers on the Notre
Dame Law Review for their thorough edits.  All errors are my own.
1 KANYE WEST, Closed on Sunday, on JESUS IS KING (GOOD Music 2019).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  These clauses are also known as the “Religion Clauses.”
3 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 &
n.2 (2012) (listing cases from each circuit applying the ministerial exception).
4 Id. at 188.
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did not adopt a clear definition of the term “minister” in this landmark case,
questions remain as to which employees qualify.5
In December 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consoli-
dated Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and St. James School v.
Biel, two cases from the Ninth Circuit, which had ruled two Catholic school
teachers with religious duties were not ministers for purposes of the ministe-
rial exception.6  In its decision, the Court will revisit Hosanna-Tabor, which
also involved a teacher in a religious school,7 and should provide more gui-
dance to lower courts in their application of the term “minister.”
This Note argues that, in order to remain consistent with the Religion
Clauses’ protection of religious autonomy, civil courts must defer to the relig-
ious group’s determination of which of its employees play a role “of substan-
tial religious importance”8 within the organization in carrying out its
religious mission under its tenets, and are therefore “ministers,” rather than
investigate and make that determination themselves.  Part I provides back-
ground information on the First Amendment and an overview of the circuit
court and Supreme Court decisions that laid the foundation for, built,
adopted, and applied the ministerial exception as described in Hosanna-
Tabor.  Part II analyzes several potential definitions of “minister” and argues
that a civil court when applying the term must defer to the religious group’s
determination of which of its employees play a role “of substantial religious
importance.”  Such a deferential standard is necessary in order to preserve
the religious autonomy contemplated by the Religion Clauses.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Foundational Principles
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”9
Incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,10 these
Religion Clauses guarantee religious freedom and protect against govern-
ment entanglement with religion.  The courts, when building and adopting
5 Although this Note centers on the term “minister,” there also remains a question as
to which groups constitute a “religious group” for purposes of the ministerial exception.
For discussions of this question, see generally Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four:
Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891 (2013); Brian M. Murray, The Elephant
in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493 (2012); Zoe¨ Robinson, What Is a “Relig-
ious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181 (2014).
6 Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 680
(2019) (mem.); Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 679 (2019).
7 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 177–78.
8 Id. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (incorporating the Establish-
ment Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free
Exercise Clause).
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the ministerial exception doctrine, relied on a series of Supreme Court cases
regarding church property disputes.  These cases established that the Relig-
ion Clauses protect churches’ autonomy from governmental interference.
The first such case, Watson v. Jones, involved a property dispute between
proslavery and antislavery factions of a local Presbyterian church.11  The
Court held it must defer to the decision of the General Assembly of the Pres-
byterian Church, as “the highest judicatory of the Presbyterian Church,” to
recognize the antislavery faction as the true owner of the property.12  This
case established the principle that courts must defer to hierarchical churches
on “questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law.”13
In 1929, the Court reiterated a similar principle in Gonzalez v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, a case involving the Catholic Church’s denial of
a chaplaincy position to a ten-year-old boy.14  Rejecting the boy’s claim that
he was entitled to the chaplaincy by virtue of the will of the chaplaincy’s
foundress, the Court explained, “In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbi-
trariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely
ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before
the secular courts as conclusive . . . .”15
In 1952, the Court heard another church property dispute, Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America.16  The
Court of Appeals of New York had declared that the right to use a Russian
Orthodox cathedral belonged to the North American churches, rather than
the Supreme Church Authority in Moscow, under a New York law requiring
every Russian Orthodox church in New York to recognize the authority of the
governing body of North American churches.17  The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the New York law violated the First Amendment
because it passed from one church authority to another the right to use the
11 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 681–85 (1872).
12 Id. at 682, 690–91, 694.
13 Id. at 727; see also id. at 728–29 (“In this country the full and free right to entertain
any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine
which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe
personal rights, is conceded to all . . . .  The right to organize voluntary religious associa-
tions to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create
tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for
the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers
within the general association, is unquestioned . . . .  It is of the essence of these religious
unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among
themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance,
subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.”).
14 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 12 (1929).
15 Id. at 11–12, 16 (“Because the appointment is a canonical act, it is the function of
the church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and
whether the candidate possesses them.”).
16 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344
U.S. 94 (1952).
17 Id. at 97–99.
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cathedral and the power to appoint a ruling hierarch, which were “strictly
ecclesiastical” matters.18  The Court described Watson v. Jones as
“radiat[ing] . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations,” which have
“power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”19  It declared,
“Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are
proven, . . . [has] federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exer-
cise of religion . . . .”20
Finally, in 1976, the Court decided Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the
United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich.21  The Illinois Supreme
Court had held that the proceedings under which the hierarchy of the Ser-
bian Orthodox Church had defrocked and replaced a bishop were defective
under the church’s own regulations and therefore arbitrary and invalid.22  In
its review, the United States Supreme Court rejected the proposition sug-
gested in Gonzalez that “arbitrary” decisions by church tribunals may be
reviewed by civil courts consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.  It reasoned that an analysis of whether a church complied with its
own laws and regulations “must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures
that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to
follow, or else in to the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to
decide the ecclesiastical question.  But this is exactly the inquiry that the First
Amendment prohibits . . . .”23  Accordingly, the Court reversed,24 holding:
[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive
inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the
highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but
must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the
religious issues of doctrine or polity before them.25
Together, these cases established that churches have the exclusive, con-
stitutional right to make judgments regarding church doctrine and govern-
ance, and these judgments must not be reevaluated by civil courts.
B. Courts of Appeals Decisions Pre-Hosanna-Tabor: Building the Ministerial
Exception
From these principles, the circuit courts began to build the ministerial
exception doctrine.  First, in 1972 in McClure v. Salvation Army, the Fifth Cir-
18 Id. at 107–08, 119, 121 (“Legislation that regulates church administration, the oper-
ation of the churches, [and] the appointment of clergy . . . prohibits the free exercise of
religion.”).
19 Id. at 116.
20 Id. (footnote omitted).
21 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
22 Id. at 708.
23 Id. at 713.
24 Id. at 725.
25 Id. at 709.
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cuit declined to apply Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196426 to the
employment of a female commissioned officer of the Salvation Army who
had brought an action for sex discrimination.27  The court, considering the
officer a “minister” and the Salvation Army a “church,” held application of
the Act in this context would violate the First Amendment.28  It reasoned,
“The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its life-
blood.  The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to
fulfill its purpose.  Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be rec-
ognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.”29
Other circuits followed suit.  The first court to use the term “ministerial
exception” was the Fourth Circuit in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists in 1985.30  The court held that the sexual and racial discrimi-
nation claims of a woman denied a pastoral position in the Seventh-day
Adventist Church were barred by the First Amendment because “state scru-
tiny of the church’s choice would infringe substantially on the church’s free
exercise of religion and would constitute impermissible government entan-
glement with church authority.”31  The court rejected ordination as a neces-
sary prerequisite for an employee to qualify as a “minister,” and asserted,
rather, that ministerial status depended on “the function of the position.”32
It held the “associate in pastoral care” position was ministerial because it
played a “significant [role] in the expression and realization of Seventh-day
Adventist beliefs.”33  The court also acknowledged that “the church is enti-
tled to pursue its own path” even when “the values of state and church clash,”
and expressed its concern that application of employment discrimination
laws would cause churches to make their decisions “with an eye to avoiding
litigation or bureaucratic entanglement rather than upon the basis of their
own personal and doctrinal assessments of who would best serve the pastoral
needs of their members.”34
The Eighth Circuit relied on similar principles in 1991 in Scharon v. St.
Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals.35  In this case, an ordained female Epis-
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
27 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 896 (1972).
28 Id. at 554, 560.  Neither the commissioned officer nor the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, as amicus curiae, disputed that the Salvation Army was a religion
or that the officer was a minister. Id. at 556.
29 Id. at 558–59.
30 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th
Cir. 1985).
31 Id. at 1165.
32 Id. at 1168.
33 Id. (reasoning an employee in that position would be responsible for “introduc[ing]
children to the life of the church,” “lead[ing] . . . Bible study,” acting “[a]s counselor and
as pastor” and as “a liaison between the church . . . and those whom it would touch with its
message,” “lead[ing] . . . rites,” and “preach[ing] occasionally from the pulpit”).
34 Id. at 1171.
35 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991).
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copal priest working as a chaplain with religious duties had been fired from a
church-affiliated hospital.36  She subsequently alleged age discrimination
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 196737 and sex
discrimination under Title VII.38  The court held that applying these statutes
in this case would violate both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exer-
cise Clause.39  Because the hospital was affiliated with a church and had “sub-
stantial religious character,”40 and the priest’s position as chaplain was the
equivalent of “clergy,”41 application of the statutes “would require ‘excessive
government entanglement with religion,’” in violation of the Establishment
Clause.42  In addition, the court laid out a rule that “[p]ersonnel decisions by
church-affiliated institutions affecting clergy are per se religious matters and
cannot be reviewed by civil courts.”43  It explained:
[R]eview [of] such decisions would require the courts to determine the
meaning of religious doctrine and canonical law and to impose a secular
court’s view of whether in the context of the particular case religious doc-
trine and canonical law support the decision the church authorities have
made.  This is precisely the kind of judicial second-guessing of decision-mak-
ing by religious organizations that the Free Exercise Clause forbids.44
The Fourth Circuit applied the ministerial exception again in 2000 in
EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh.45  In this case, a lay Catholic music
teacher and later director of music ministry for a Catholic cathedral claimed
sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII after her duties were rede-
signed and reassigned to men, both Catholic and non-Catholic.46  The court
held that the First Amendment barred the suit because, given the “integral
role of music in the spiritual life of the church,”47 the music ministry and
teaching positions were “‘important to the spiritual and pastoral mission’ of
the church” and therefore ministerial.48
36 Id. at 361.
37 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012).
38 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); Scharon, 929 F.2d at 361.
39 Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363.
40 Id. at 362 (quoting Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 736 F.
Supp. 1018, 1019 (E.D. Miss. 1990)) (taking into consideration the inclusion of church
representatives on the hospital’s board of directors and the requirement of church
approval before amendment of its articles of incorporation).
41 Id. (taking into consideration that chaplains had to be ordained and were tasked
with “[p]rovid[ing] a religious ministry of pastoral care, pastoral counseling . . . and liturgi-
cal services for persons in the hospital” and that Scharon “performed numerous formal
religious ceremonies” (first alteration and omission in original)).
42 Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
43 Id. at 363.
44 Id.
45 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000).
46 Id. at 798.
47 Id. at 804.
48 Id. at 802 (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)); see also id. at 804 (“[T]he role of the music minister ‘is so
significant in the expression and realization of [the church’s] beliefs that state interven-
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The Sixth Circuit in 2007 in Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc. heard an
appeal from a former resident in a Methodist hospital’s accredited Clinical
Pastoral Education program.49  The appellant claimed that the hospital vio-
lated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)50 by terminating her employ-
ment because of a psychiatric evaluation.51  The court, which had previously
adopted the principle of the ministerial exception,52 held that the former
resident’s claim could not be maintained in court because she was a “minis-
ter” given her pastoral role.53  In addition, the hospital, by agreeing to
adhere to the accreditation association’s nondiscrimination policy, did not
waive its First Amendment right to the ministerial exception.54
The courts of appeals building the ministerial exception justified it on
the grounds that a religious group’s ministers are essential to its mission, and
a civil court’s scrutiny of its choice of minister would violate the First Amend-
ment both by infringing upon the group’s free exercise rights and by imper-
missibly entangling itself with religion.  They applied the term “minister” to
not only ordained clergy, but a variety of positions, including nonordained
pastors and music directors.  By the time the Supreme Court heard Hosanna-
Tabor in 2012, every United States court of appeals had adopted some form
of the ministerial exception doctrine.55
C. Hosanna-Tabor
1. The Facts
The suit was brought against Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School, a member congregation of the Lutheran
Church–Missouri Synod, which ran a small, Christian K-8 school.56  The
synod classified teachers as either “called” or “lay.”57  Called teachers, who
were given the title “Minister of Religion, Commissioned,” were “called” by a
parish after satisfying certain academic requirements.58  Called teachers were
considered to be answering a vocation by God to teach for that congrega-
tion.59  When called teachers were not available, Hosanna-Tabor would hire
tion in the appointment process would excessively inhibit religious liberty.’” (quoting Ray-
burn, 772 F.2d at 1168) (second alteration in original)).
49 Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 2007).
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
51 Hollins, 474 F.3d at 224.
52 See Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 940, 942–43
(6th Cir. 1992); Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986).
53 Hollins, 474 F.3d at 226.
54 Id. at 226–27.
55 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 &
n.2 (2012) (listing a case from each circuit applying the ministerial exception).
56 Id. at 177.
57 Id.
58 Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 42, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 10-553)).
59 Id.
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lay teachers, who did not need to be Lutheran or trained by the synod.60  Lay
teachers performed essentially the same duties as called teachers.61
Hosanna-Tabor hired Cheryl Perich initially as a lay teacher.62  Soon
after, Perich accepted Hosanna-Tabor’s call to serve the congregation as a
called teacher.63  She received a “diploma of vocation,” which designated her
as a “commissioned minister.”64  During her service, Perich taught children
both secular and religious subjects.65  She also led students in prayer and
attended and occasionally led a weekly school-wide chapel service.66
Perich began experiencing symptoms of narcolepsy and went on disabil-
ity leave.67  After several months, she notified the school principal that she
would soon be able to return to work.68  The principal replied, expressing
her concern that Perich would not yet be ready to return to teaching and
informing her that they had already hired a lay teacher to fill her position for
the rest of the school year.69  The congregation decided to propose to Perich
a “peaceful release” from her call, offering to pay for a portion of her health
insurance premiums in exchange for her resignation.70  Perich refused the
offer.71
The next month, Perich “presented herself at the school” and refused to
leave before being provided written documentation that she had reported to
work that morning.72  Later that afternoon, the principal informed Perich
she would likely be fired, and she responded that she would be asserting her
legal rights.73
The school board chairman informed Perich that the school board was
considering “rescinding her call in light of her ‘regrettable’ actions,” includ-
ing her “insubordination and disruptive behavior” and “the damage she had
done to her ‘working relationship’ with the school by ‘threatening to take
legal action.’”74  The congregation voted to rescind her call, and Hosanna-
Tabor sent her a termination letter.75
Perich, alleging Hosanna-Tabor had violated the ADA by terminating
her, filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 178.
63 Id.
64 Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 58, at 42).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 58, at 186).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 179.
73 Id.
74 Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 58, at 55, 229).
75 Id.
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(EEOC).76  The EEOC agreed and filed suit against Hosanna-Tabor, claim-
ing Hosanna-Tabor had unlawfully retaliated against Perich by firing her for
threatening to sue under the ADA.77  Perich intervened in the suit, claiming
unlawful retaliation under both the ADA and state law.78  Hosanna-Tabor
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the ministerial exception
barred Perich’s claims.79
2. The Courts Below
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
granted Hosanna-Tabor’s motion for summary judgment.80  The court, after
examining the “function and actual role”81 of Perich’s position, determined
she was a ministerial employee.82  It noted her title of  “commissioned minis-
ter” and reasoned that the school had “treated [her] like a minister and held
her out to the world as such long before [the] litigation began.”83  In addi-
tion, it determined that inquiring into Hosanna-Tabor’s decision to fire Per-
ich would impermissibly entangle church and state.84
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.85  It
noted that “the overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the
issue have held that parochial school teachers such as Perich, who teach pri-
marily secular subjects, do not classify as ministerial employees for purposes
of the [ministerial] exception.”86  Because “Perich’s employment duties were
identical when she was a [lay] teacher and a called teacher,”87 and her “pri-
mary function was teaching secular subjects,”88 she was not a “minister”
within the meaning of the ministerial exception, no matter her title.89  In
addition, the court asserted that “Perich’s claim would not require the court
to analyze any church doctrine.”90
76 Id.
77 Id. at 180.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881,
883 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
81 Id. at 887.
82 Id. at 891.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 891–92.
85 EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782
(6th Cir. 2010).
86 Id. at 778.
87 Id. at 779.
88 Id. at 780.
89 Id. at 780–81.
90 Id. at 781.
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3. The Supreme Court’s Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari91 and reversed the judgment of
the court of appeals.92  It officially adopted the ministerial exception doc-
trine, stating that both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause “bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious
group to fire one of its ministers.”93
The Court began its analysis with the history of “[c]ontrovers[ies]
between church and state over religious offices” leading to the adoption of
the First Amendment—from Magna Carta’s declaration of church autonomy
in England in 1215, to the Act of Supremacy’s designation of the English
monarch as the supreme head of the church, to the Puritans’ flight to New
England in search of greater religious autonomy, to the reactions of the
southern colonists who, although they had brought the Church of England
with them, “sometimes chafed at the control exercised by the Crown and its
representatives over religious offices.”94  The Court explained that the Relig-
ion Clauses were meant to “ensure[ ] that the new Federal Government—
unlike the English Crown—would have no role in filling ecclesiastical
offices.”95  It pointed to statements by James Madison, “the leading architect
of the religion clauses of the First Amendment,”96 who said “that the selec-
tion of church ‘functionaries’ was an ‘entirely ecclesiastical’ matter” left to
the church’s discretion and who vetoed a bill that regulated the “election and
removal of . . . [m]inister[s]” because of his understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause.97  Finally, the Court considered the church property disputes
discussed above98 that established church autonomy principles.99
The Court then officially adopted the ministerial exception that the
courts of appeals had “uniformly recognized” to “preclude[ ] application of
[employment discrimination laws] to claims concerning the employment
relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.”100  It
explained:
The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their minis-
ters.  Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or pun-
91 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 563 U.S. 903 (2011)
(mem.).
92 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196
(2012).
93 Id. at 181.
94 Id. at 182–83.
95 Id. at 184 (“The Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing
ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of
religious groups to select their own.”).
96 Id. (quoting Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 141 (2011)).
97 Id. at 184–85 (emphasis omitted) (first quoting Letter from James Madison to
Bishop John Carroll (Nov. 20, 1806), reprinted in 20 RECORDS AM. CATH. HIST. SOC’Y PHILA.
63 (1909); and then quoting 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 983 (1811)).
98 See discussion supra Section I.A.
99 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 185–87.
100 Id. at 188.
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ishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere
employment decision.  Such action interferes with the internal governance
of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those
who will personify its beliefs.  By imposing an unwanted minister, the state
infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right
to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.  According the
state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful
also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involve-
ment in such ecclesiastical decisions.101
The Court next applied the ministerial exception to the case.102  For the
determination of whether an employee is a “minister” under the ministerial
exception, the court declined “to adopt a rigid formula” and instead found it
sufficient to conclude that Perich was a minister, “given all the circumstances
of her employment.”103  It then described the four “considerations” that
went into this conclusion: (1) “the formal title given Perich by the Church,”
(2) “the substance reflected in that title,” (3) “her own use of that title,” and
(4) “the important religious functions she performed for the church.”104  It
criticized the court of appeals for not “see[ing] any relevance in the fact that
Perich was a commissioned minister,”105 for giving “too much weight to the
fact that lay teachers at the school performed the same religious duties as
Perich,”106 and for “plac[ing] too much emphasis on Perich’s performance
of secular duties.”107  The Court explained that the First Amendment barred
it from providing the relief Perich sought because “requiring the Church to
accept a minister it did not want . . . would have plainly violated the Church’s
freedom under the Religion Clauses to select its own ministers,” and award-
ing “frontpay in lieu of reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and punitive
damages, and attorney’s fees . . . would operate as a penalty on the Church
101 Id. at 188–89.
102 Id. at 190.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 191–92 (“Hosanna-Tabor held Perich out as a minister, with a role distinct
from that of most of its members . . . .  Perich’s title as a minister reflected a significant
degree of religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning . . . .  Perich
held herself out as a minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to religious ser-
vice, according to its terms.  She did so in other ways as well . . . .  Perich’s job duties
reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission.”).
105 Id. at 192–93 (“Although such a title, by itself, does not automatically ensure cover-
age, the fact that an employee has been ordained or commissioned as a minister is surely
relevant, as is the fact that significant religious training and a recognized religious mission
underlie the description of the employee’s position.”).
106 Id. at 193 (“[T]hough relevant, it cannot be dispositive that others not formally
recognized as ministers by the church perform the same functions—particularly when, as
here, they did so only because commissioned ministers were unavailable.”).
107 Id. at 193–94 (“The heads of congregations themselves often have a mix of duties,
including secular ones . . . .  The amount of time an employee spends on particular activi-
ties is relevant in assessing that employee’s status, but that factor cannot be considered in
isolation . . . .”).
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for terminating an unwanted minister.”108  The Court also affirmed that a
religious group is free to fire, without government interference, its ministers
for any reason, religious or not, so an inquiry into whether Hosanna-Tabor’s
asserted reason for firing Perich was pretextual was unnecessary.109
The Court concluded with an acknowledgement of the competing inter-
ests at stake in ministerial exception cases.  It acknowledged that society has
an important interest in the enforcement of employment discrimination stat-
utes.110  It also affirmed that religious groups have an important interest, too,
in “choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out
their mission.”111  In cases where fired ministers claim their termination was
discriminatory, the courts need not and may not inquire into the church’s
reasoning, because “the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.”112
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred, writing a separate opin-
ion asserting that because the term “minister” and the practice of “ordina-
tion” are not used by many religions, courts should focus on the function of
the employee to determine who is a “minister” for purposes of the ministerial
exception.113  Under his reasoning, the ministerial exception exists because
the First Amendment protects religious groups’ right to practice “certain key
religious activities,” and consequently also their right to choose who will per-
form those “functions.”114  Therefore, “[t]he ‘ministerial’ exception should
be tailored to this purpose” and “apply to any ‘employee’ who leads a relig-
ious organization, conducts worship services or important religious ceremo-
nies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.”115  Because
Perich “played a substantial role in ‘conveying the Church’s message and car-
rying out its mission,’” she was a minister, and the ministerial exception
barred her suit.116  Justice Alito agreed with the majority that it was irrelevant
whether Hosanna-Tabor’s reason for firing Perich was pretextual and went
even further to say that it would be “dangerous[ ]” to allow such an inquiry,
because “[i]n order to probe the real reason for [Perich’s] firing, a civil
court—and perhaps a jury—would be required to make a judgment about
church doctrine.”117
108 Id. at 194.
109 Id. at 194–95 (explaining that the EEOC and Perich’s suggestion that Hosanna-
Tabor’s reason for firing her was pretextual “misses the point of the ministerial exception,”
because a church’s choice of minister “is the church’s alone”).
110 Id. at 196.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 199.
115 Id. at 204.
116 Id. at 204 (quoting majority opinion).
117 Id. at 205–06 (“The credibility of Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted reason for terminating
[Perich’s] employment could not be assessed without taking into account both the impor-
tance that the Lutheran Church attaches to the doctrine of internal dispute resolution and
the degree to which that tenet compromised [Perich’s] religious function . . . .  [W]hatever
the truth of the matter might be, the mere adjudication of such questions would pose
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Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion as well, agreeing that “the
Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception” but
asserting that civil courts must also “defer to a religious organization’s good-
faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”118  He explained that
the Religion Clauses protect religious groups’ “autonomy in matters of inter-
nal governance,” including the right to select its ministers, and argued that
this right would be “hollow” if civil courts were allowed to “second-guess” the
religious group’s “sincere determination that a given employee is a ‘minister’
under the organization’s theological tenets.”119  Underlying his argument
was the premise that “[t]he question whether an employee is a minister is
itself religious in nature,” and “the answer will vary widely,” given the variety
of leadership structures and doctrines of religious groups.120  A “bright-line
test” or “multifactor analysis” for the determination of who is a “minister”
would put at a disadvantage religious groups whose teachings or practices are
unusual or disagreeable to the public.121  In addition, such groups who are
uncertain about whether their employment decisions would be protected by
civil courts would be pressured to conform to mainstream ideas to avoid lia-
bility.122  For Justice Thomas, the ministerial exception applied in this case
merely because “Hosanna-Tabor sincerely considered Perich a minister.”123
D. Courts of Appeals Decisions Post-Hosanna-Tabor: Applying the Ministerial
Exception
The Supreme Court’s decision to decline to adopt a “rigid formula” for
the determination of who is a minister, combined with the concurring opin-
ions’ presentations of competing clearer rules, has unsurprisingly led to a
lack of consistency among the circuit courts in the application of the ministe-
rial exception.
grave problems for religious autonomy: It would require calling witnesses to testify about
the importance and priority of the religious doctrine in question, with a civil factfinder
sitting in ultimate judgment of what the accused church really believes, and how important
that belief is to the church’s overall mission.”).
118 Id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 196–97.
120 Id. at 197.
121 Id.
122 Id.  For example, many Christian denominations use the titles “Pastor,” “Reverend,”
or “Father” when referring to the leaders of their churches.  A court evaluating the employ-
ment relationship between a church and an employee with one of these titles would almost
certainly conclude that this employee is a minister.  Knowing this, a religious group who
would not otherwise use a formal title such as these may be induced to do so, in order to
increase its likelihood of protection under the ministerial exception.  In addition, if ordi-
nation or formal religious training were specific “factors” in the analysis, a religious group
may be induced to require its employees to participate in a ceremony or to undergo relig-
ious training and acquire a certificate, in order to ensure the group’s protection under the
ministerial exception.
123 Id. at 198.
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Less than a year after Hosanna-Tabor was decided, the Fifth Circuit
applied the newly stated ministerial exception in Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of
Austin.124  Cannata, the former music director of a Catholic church, sued the
diocese, claiming his employment had been terminated in violation of the
ADEA and the ADA.125  Because he “lacked the requisite education, training,
and experience” for “liturgical responsibilities,” Cannata had been responsi-
ble for other tasks, including overseeing the budget of the music department,
managing and maintaining the sound equipment in the music room and
music area of the sanctuary, and rehearsing with and accompanying choir
members and cantors during church services.126  Following Hosanna-Tabor’s
lead, and describing its method as a “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis,”
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the ministerial exception applied in the cir-
cumstances of the case.127  The court affirmed that Cannata’s secular duties
and lack of formal religious training were not dispositive.128  Rather, after
looking at the evidence, it accepted the diocese’s assertion that music plays
an “important role . . . in the celebration of Mass.”129  The Court reasoned
that because Cannata played piano during Mass and “made unilateral impor-
tant decisions regarding the musical direction at Mass,” he “played an inte-
gral role in the celebration of Mass,” thereby “further[ing] the mission of the
church” and “help[ing to] convey the church’s message and carry out its
mission.”130
Three years later, in a case called Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellow-
ship/USA, the Sixth Circuit applied the ministerial exception to the employ-
ment discrimination claims of a former spiritual director of an evangelical
campus mission.131  The court determined that the mission, called InterVars-
ity Christian Fellowship/USA (IVCF), although neither a church nor an
organization “tied to a specific denominational faith,” was “an organization
that can assert the ministerial exception” because its Christian name and
“mission of Christian ministry and teaching” were “marked by clear [and]
124 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012).
125 Id. at 170.
126 Id. at 171.
127 Id. at 176.
128 Id. at 177.
129 Id. (“[The diocese] introduced evidence that all musicians, regardless of whether
they are professional or volunteer or work full- or part-time, ‘exercise a genuine liturgical
ministry,’ meaning that they ‘work[ ] in collaboration with the parish pastor in carrying
out the Church’s mission by participating in the threefold ministry of Christ.’  In particu-
lar, [the diocese] produced evidence that the Music Director provides a major service by
overseeing the planning and coordination of the church’s music program, fostering the
active participation of the ‘liturgical assembly’ in singing, and promoting the various musi-
cians—choir members, psalmists, cantors, and organists—all of whom play instruments in
service of the liturgy.  Thus, the person who leads the music during Mass is an integral part
of Mass and ‘a lay liturgical minister actively participating in the sacrament of the Eucha-
rist.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Brief of Appellees at 14–15, Cannata, 700
F.3d 169 (No. 11-51151)).
130 Id. at 177–78.
131 Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 831 (6th Cir. 2015).
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obvious religious characteristics.”132  The Sixth Circuit, while acknowledging
that the Hosanna-Tabor Court declined to “adopt a rigid formula” for the
determination of who qualifies as a minister, then applied the same “four
factors” considered by the Supreme Court.133  It found that two of the four
factors—formal title and religious function—were present in the case, and
held that these two factors together are sufficient to conclude that an
employee is a minister.134  This rather formulaic analysis arguably conflicts
with the Fifth Circuit’s looser totality-of-the-circumstances approach.135
In 2017, the Second Circuit applied the ministerial exception to the sex
discrimination and retaliation claims of Fratello, a former principal of a
Catholic school.136  After carefully examining the archdiocese’s administra-
tive manual for its schools, which detailed the mission of the schools and the
role of their principals, the court took into consideration Fratello’s religious
job functions and her performance evaluations.137  The court emphasized
that the factors considered in Hosanna-Tabor were not exclusive in the deter-
mination of whether an employee is a minister.138  Because Hosanna-Tabor
provided “only limited direction,” it explained, it decided to “receive and
accept substantial further guidance from the concurrence of Justice Alito,”
which it found to be “persuasive and extremely helpful.”139  After holding
that courts should primarily focus on the function of the employee in their
determination of who is a minister,140 it applied the four “considerations”
listed in Hosana-Tabor and concluded that although Fratello’s formal title
“weigh[ed] against application of the ministerial exception,” she was a minis-
ter because “she served many religious functions to advance the School’s
Roman Catholic mission.”141  This focus on religious function puts the Sec-
ond Circuit at odds with the Fifth Circuit’s totality-of-the-circumstances
approach and the Sixth Circuit’s rule that formal title and religious function
together are sufficient.
132 Id. at 833–34 (quoting Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363
F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir. 2004)); see also id. at 831 (“IVCF’s purpose ‘is to establish and
advance at colleges and universities witnessing communities of students and faculty who
follow Jesus as Savior and Lord: growing in love for God, God’s Word, God’s people of
every ethnicity and culture and God’s purposes in the world.’”).
133 Id. at 834–35.
134 Id.
135 Compare Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 2012)
(“Any attempt to calcify the particular considerations that motivated the Court in Hosanna-
Tabor into a ‘rigid formula’ would not be appropriate.”), with Conlon, 777 F.3d at 835
(“[W]here both factors—formal title and religious function—are present, the ministerial
exception clearly applies.”).
136 Fratello v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 2017).
137 Id. at 193–97.
138 Id. at 204 (“Hosanna-Tabor instructs only as to what we might take into account as
relevant, including the four considerations on which it relied; it neither limits the inquiry
to those considerations nor requires their application in every case.”).
139 Id. at 205.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 206–09.
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In 2018, the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal from Grussgott, a former
Hebrew teacher for a Jewish day school, who claimed her employment had
been terminated due to her cognitive issues resulting from a brain tumor, in
violation of the ADA.142  The court held that the school was a religious insti-
tution entitled to the ministerial exception because of its religious mission,
despite its nonobservance of Orthodox principles, lack of ordained clergy in
a supervisory role, and nondiscrimination policy.143  Per the court, whether
Grussgott was a minister was a “closer question.”144  While noting that the
Court in Hosanna-Tabor “expressly declined to delineate a ‘rigid formula’ for
deciding when an employee is a minister,” it examined the four factors con-
sidered in Hosanna-Tabor because they “provide a useful framework.”145  The
court found that Grussgott’s job title and the use of her title weighed against,
but the substance reflected in her title and her important religious functions
supported, application of the ministerial exception.146  It suggested that
“where there is no sign of subterfuge,” a court should defer to “a religious
organization’s designation of what constitutes religious activity.”147  Rejecting
a rule focused on function, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, under the
totality of the circumstances, Grussgott was a minister because “[h]er integral
role in teaching her students about Judaism and the school’s motivation in
hiring her, in particular, demonstrate that her role furthered the school’s
religious mission,” so the ministerial exception barred her claim.148  The Sev-
enth Circuit therefore adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances approach simi-
lar to that of the Fifth Circuit, but with deference to a religious organization’s
determination of what constitutes a religious activity when analyzing an
employee’s religious function.
II. WHY DEFERENCE TO RELIGIOUS GROUPS IS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
This lack of consistency in analysis among the circuits is evidence that
the courts of appeals need more guidance from the Supreme Court as they
apply the ministerial exception. Hosanna-Tabor confirmed that the Free
Exercise Clause “protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments,” and the Establishment Clause “prohibits
government involvement in . . . ecclesiastical decisions,” including the deter-
mination of “which individuals will minister to the faithful.”149  Together,
they support the existence of a ministerial exception that “precludes applica-
142 Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2018).
143 Id. at 657–58.
144 Id. at 658.
145 Id. at 658–59 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012)).
146 Id. at 660.
147 Id.; see also id. (“[D]rawing a distinction between secular and religious teaching . . .
[is] difficult [and] impermissibly entangles the government with religion.”).
148 Id. at 657; see id. 661–62 (rejecting a rule focused on function).
149 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89
(2012).
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tion of [employment discrimination laws] to claims concerning the employ-
ment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.”150  The
parameters of who qualifies as a minister should be set keeping in mind this
rationale for the existence of the ministerial exception in the first place—the
importance of religious groups’ autonomy in deciding religious matters.151
The term “minister” itself is problematic and may be adding to the
inconsistency in the courts’ determination of which employees a religious
group may hire and fire without interference by the government.  There are
many conflicting common usages of the word.  The current version of the
Oxford English Dictionary provides a variety of definitions, including, “a per-
son holding authority by virtue of his rank within a Christian religious order
or similar organization,” “a person appointed to perform a liturgical duty or
other service in the Christian church,” “a member of the clergy; an ordained
pastor,” and “an official of a non-Christian religion.”152  These conflicting
common usages may confuse the inquiry and obscure the meaning of “minis-
ter” as a legal term of art in the ministerial exception context.153  In addi-
tion, because the term “minister” is primarily used by Protestant religions,154
there is a danger that the ministerial exception will be “tether[ed] . . . too
close[ly] to the Protestant Christian concept of ministers.”155  Judge Posner
of the Seventh Circuit has criticized the terms “ministerial exception” and
“ministers exception” as “too narrow” and has suggested the doctrine be
called the “internal affairs doctrine” instead.156
However, given the widespread use of the term “minister” in the ministe-
rial exception context, it is unlikely to be replaced.  The conflicting common
usages, though, make it all the more important for the Supreme Court to
provide a clear definition or test for “minister” as a legal term of art.  Uncer-
tainty in the definition undermines the desire of religious organizations and
lower courts to “structure their actions in accordance with the law”157 and
may disadvantage nonmainstream religious groups.158  It has also caused
some courts of appeals to apply Hosanna-Tabor’s four considerations as a
framework for their analysis despite their acknowledgement that the Court in
Hosanna-Tabor did not intend to adopt a “rigid formula.”159  As noted above,
the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in two cases arising out of the
150 Id. at 188.
151 See id. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The ‘ministerial’ exception should be tailored
to [its] purpose.”).
152 Minister, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002).
153 See Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 934 F.3d 568, 569–70 (7th Cir. 2019) (dis-
cussing confusion inherent in the term “ministerial exception”).
154 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 198
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
155 Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 621 (9th Cir. 2018) (Fisher, J., dissenting).
156 Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 474–75 (7th Cir. 2008).
157 Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 2012).
158 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring).
159 See, e.g., Biel, 911 F.3d at 607–09; Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882
F.3d 655, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2018); Fratello v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 206 (2d Cir.
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Ninth Circuit,160 which has adopted a fairly restrictive definition of “minis-
ter,” limiting it to include only those employees who “serve a leadership role
in the faith.”161  Although the oral arguments were postponed,162 the Court
will give its take on the Ninth Circuit’s definition soon.
This Part describes a variety of approaches the Court could choose to
adopt to determine who qualifies as a “minister” for purposes of the ministe-
rial exception.  This Note argues that “minister” should be defined as an
employee who plays a role “of substantial religious importance”163 in further-
ance of the religious group’s mission.  It also expands on Justice Thomas’s
concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor by arguing that because an accurate
application of the legal term of art “minister” to any employee of a religious
group requires an investigation into and an analysis of the religious group’s
particular doctrine and beliefs, and civil courts are constitutionally barred
from performing such investigations, civil courts must defer to the religious
group’s determination of which of its employees play a role “of substantial
religious importance” and are therefore ministers.
A. Option 1: Only Clergy
One option for the definition of “minister” is to limit it to clergy.
Although the relative ease in applying this definition is appealing, a require-
ment of formal ordination or title was not supported by any member of the
Court in Hosanna-Tabor or any of the circuits.  Rather, this definition has
been explicitly rejected,164 and the term “minister” has been applied in the
ministerial exception context to a variety of nonclergy, including a lay choir
director,165 a canon-law faculty member of a university,166 a nonordained
associate in pastoral care,167 and faculty of a seminary.168  One problem with
using this restrictive definition is that it would pigeonhole religious groups
and pressure them to use ordination or certain formal titles for their employ-
2017); Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 834 (6th Cir. 2015);
Cannata, 700 F.3d at 176.
160 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
161 Biel, 911 F.3d at 611; see also infra Section II.B (discussing the possibility of defining
a “minister” as a religious group’s leaders and decisionmakers).
162 St. James School v. Biel, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/
cases/st-james-school-v-biel/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
163 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring).
164 See id. at 190 (majority opinion) (“Every Court of Appeals to have considered the
question has concluded that the ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a relig-
ious congregation, and we agree.”); see, e.g., Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of
Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[T]he ministerial exception
encompasses more than a church’s ordained ministers.”).
165 Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1999).
166 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
167 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th
Cir. 1985).
168 EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. Unit A July
1981).
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ees in order to defend themselves under the ministerial exception.  This type
of government-caused coercion is inappropriate under the Establishment
Clause and its underlying principles of religious autonomy.  Some circuits
have, however, laid down a rule that although not all ministers are clergy, all
members of the clergy are per se ministers.169
B. Option 2: Leaders and Decisionmakers
A less restrictive definition of “minister” could be a religious group’s
leaders and decisionmakers, i.e., those employees who make decisions
regarding the religious group’s governance, faith, worship, message, and mis-
sion.  These employees are held out as models of the faith and representa-
tives of the values of the religious group.  Examples of positions that would
qualify as “ministers” under this definition include priests, imams, pastors,
worship leaders (including musicians), and religion teachers, but it would
likely exclude teachers of secular subjects without religious duties, janitorial
staff, cooks, and similar positions with little influence on decisions regarding
religious matters.
This definition is supported by Hosanna-Tabor’s discussion of the history
leading to the Establishment Clause and the Founders’ intention to “fore-
close the possibility of a national church.”170 Hosanna-Tabor described how
the king in the Magna Carta accepted the English Church’s right to “free-
dom of elections,” but after the English monarchy again took control over
who may be the church’s officials and required ministers to assent to certain
tenets of faith and follow certain modes of worship, the Puritans fled to the
New World “to elect their own ministers and establish their own modes of
worship.”171  All of these concerns dealt with who had the authority to make
decisions regarding the faith—the church or the Crown. Hosanna-Tabor also
asserted that the Religion Clauses were meant to “ensure[ ] that the new Fed-
eral Government—unlike the English Crown—would have no role in filling
ecclesiastical offices”172 and supported this assertion by referencing state-
ments and actions of James Madison, “the leading architect of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment,”173 who maintained that the Constitution
precluded the federal government from influencing the “selection,” “elec-
tion,” or “removal” of “ecclesiastical individuals.”174  These officials and
169 See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th
Cir. 1991) (“Personnel decisions by church-affiliated institutions affecting clergy are per se
religious matters and cannot be reviewed by civil courts . . . .); Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1291
(“The paradigmatic application of the ministerial exception is to the employment of an
ordained minister . . . .”).
170 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 182–85
(2012).
171 Id. at 182 (quoting J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA app. IV, at 317, cl. 1 (1965)).
172 Id. at 184.
173 Id. (quoting Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 141 (2011)).
174 Id. at 184–85 (quoting Letter from James Madison, supra note 97) (in response to
the Catholic bishop’s request for his opinion regarding who should direct the affairs of the
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“ecclesiastical individuals” were the decisionmakers.  If the new federal gov-
ernment could influence who could be the decisionmakers, like the English
Crown could, it could influence the resulting decisions directing the relig-
ious group and thereby effectively establish a national church.  This result is
what the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent.
This concern over the power of the government to influence a religious
group’s decisionmakers, and thereby its decisions, underlies the holdings of
the church property dispute cases that Hosanna-Tabor cites.  In Watson v.
Jones, the Court stated, “[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith,
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the]
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals
must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them.”175  In Kedroff,
the Court held, “[R]eligious organizations [have] . . . power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as
well as those of faith and doctrine.”176  Multiple circuit courts have quoted
this statement in the context of the ministerial exception, indicating this
religious decision-making autonomy described in Kedroff lives on as reason-
ing underlying the ministerial exception doctrine.177
The language other circuit courts have used before and after Hosanna-
Tabor to describe the principles underlying the ministerial exception also
indicates the importance of keeping religious leaders and decisionmakers
out from under the influence of the government.  The Fourth Circuit has
declared, “Any attempt by government to restrict a church’s free choice of its
leaders . . . constitutes a burden on the church’s free exercise rights.”178  The
Seventh Circuit said the ministerial exception is based on the assumption
that “Congress does not want courts to interfere in the internal management of
churches,” including decisions as to “whom to ordain (or retain as an
ordained minister), how to allocate authority over the affairs of the church,
or which rituals and observances are authentic.”179  The Fifth Circuit in Can-
nata determined that a church music director was a minister “[b]ecause he
made unilateral, important decisions regarding the musical direction at
Catholic Church in the newly acquired Louisiana Purchase, replying that the “scrupulous
policy of the Constitution in guarding against a [p]olitical interference with religious
affairs” precluded the federal government from giving its opinion on the “selection of
ecclesiastical individuals”); and quoting 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 983 (1811) (vetoing a bill that
would have incorporated the Protestant Episcopal Church within the District of Columbia
because it would have violated the Establishment Clause, especially because it “compre-
hend[ed] even the election and removal of the Minister of the [Church]”)).
175 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872) (emphasis added).
176 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344
U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (emphasis added).
177 See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church,
173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).
178 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th
Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
179 Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
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Mass.”180  The Seventh Circuit, citing Hosanna-Tabor, asserted that under
both Religion Clauses, “religious organizations are free to hire and fire their
ministerial leaders without governmental interference.”181
The Ninth Circuit in Biel v. St. James School adopted this definition of
“minister.”182  It said that although “[r]eligious organizations enjoy a broad
right to select their own leaders,” the First Amendment “does not provide
carte blanche to disregard antidiscrimination laws when it comes to other
employees who do not serve a leadership role in the faith.”183  The court
suggested that an employee must be tasked with “pronounced religious lead-
ership and guidance” in order for him or her to be considered a “minis-
ter.”184  It referenced the “historical backdrop to the First Amendment”
focusing on “heads of congregations and other high-level religious leaders”
as support for the notion that, “to comport with the Founders’ intent, the
[ministerial] exception need not extend to every employee whose job has a
religious component.”185
Despite the support described above, defining “ministers” as the leaders
and decisionmakers of a religious group is insufficient to protect the relig-
ious autonomy contemplated by the Religion Clauses.  The Establishment
Clause’s text, historical backdrop, and intention suggest it prohibits the
establishment of a national church and therefore also governmental interfer-
ence in the selection of religious leaders.  However, this clause is only part of
the basis of the ministerial exception doctrine.  The First Amendment also
protects the “free exercise” of religion,186 which encompasses not only relig-
ious beliefs and decisions, but also actions and practices in accordance with
those beliefs, including religious functions.  For the same reason it would be
dangerous for the government to interfere in the selection of religious lead-
ers because of its resulting influence on their decisions, it would be danger-
ous for the government to interfere with the selection of those who will
perform religious functions because of its resulting influence on their
actions.  To protect the religious autonomy contemplated by the First
Amendment and reiterated in the Supreme Court cases regarding church
property disputes, the circuit court decisions building the ministerial excep-
tion, and Hosanna-Tabor, any definition of “minister” must include not only
the leaders but also those employees who perform religious functions for the
religious group.187
180 Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 178 (5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis
added).
181 Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2018)
(emphasis added).
182 Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 680
(2019) (mem.).
183 Id. at 606, 611.
184 Id. at 610.
185 Id. at 610–11.
186 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
187 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 199
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the freedom of religious
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C. Option 3: Those Who Perform Key Religious Functions
In his concurrence, Justice Alito advocated a functional definition of
minister, expanding it from religious leaders to “any ‘employee’ who leads a
religious organization, conducts worship services or important religious cere-
monies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.”188  He
explained, “Religious autonomy means that religious authorities must be free
to determine who is qualified to serve in positions of substantial religious
importance.”189  He acknowledged that different religious groups will have
different views as to which positions qualify as being “of substantial religious
importance,” but he justified his list of “key” religious functions by saying that
these functions are “essential to the independence of practically all religious
groups.”190
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, many circuits had adopted a functional defini-
tion of “minister” for purposes of the ministerial exception.  A common func-
tional definition was that “ministers” included ordained ministers in addition
to employees whose “primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith,
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or partici-
pation in religious ritual and worship.”191  The Fourth Circuit, this defini-
tion’s original judicial source, admitted that the application of this functional
definition “necessarily requires a court to determine whether a position is
important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.”192
This requirement is problematic.  The purpose of the ministerial excep-
tion is to protect religious groups’ autonomy in religious matters, for the sake
of both the religious group and the polity.  Part of the problem with the
application of employment discrimination laws to the employment relation-
ship between a religious group and its minister is that investigation into the
claims would entail impermissible government entanglement with religion,
in violation of the Establishment Clause.193  An investigation into the impor-
groups to engage in certain key religious activities, including the conducting of worship
services and other religious ceremonies and rituals, as well as the critical process of com-
municating the faith.  Accordingly, religious groups must be free to choose the personnel
who are essential to the performance of these functions.”).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 200.
190 Id. at 199–200.
191 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th
Cir. 1985) (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evalua-
tion of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1545 (1979)).  Many
other cases used this functional definition, as well. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 2010); Hollins v. Methodist
Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,
463 (D.C. Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F.
Supp. 2d 881, 887 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
192 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
193 Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d
343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing a “concern . . . that in investigating employment dis-
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tance of an employee’s role to the mission of the church would likely entan-
gle the government in a religious question even more problematically than
would an investigation into why the church fired the employee.  In addition,
civil courts are simply “inept” to “inquir[e] into the value of an employee in
furthering a religious institution’s sectarian mission.”194  As this question is
religious in nature, the religious group, not a civil court, is in the best posi-
tion to answer this question, and the civil court is actually prohibited from
doing so.  Finally, the Free Exercise Clause protects not only religious activity
but also religious beliefs, and religious beliefs and doctrine are central to the
determination of the importance of an employee’s role in furthering a relig-
ious group’s mission.  A religious group has a First Amendment right to
declare whether its employee plays an important religious role in accordance
with its own religious beliefs and doctrine, as this is essentially a religious
question, so a court must defer to the religious group’s determination.
In addition, a specific list of activities crucial to the autonomy of “practi-
cally all” religious groups could still leave some groups out in the cold.
Depending on a given religion’s specific beliefs, a person may be a messen-
ger or a teacher of the faith merely by living his or her life in accordance with
the religion’s values,195 yet a civil court using a functional definition might
disagree that this practice is a religious “function.”  The importance of other
more unusual practices of nonmainstream religious groups also are at risk of
being misunderstood by civil courts.
D. Option 4: Those Who Are Ministers Under the Totality of the Circumstances
The Hosanna-Tabor Court declined to adopt a “rigid formula” to deter-
mine whether an employee qualifies as a minister for purposes of the ministe-
rial exception, opting instead for, arguably, a “totality-of-the-circumstances
test.”196  Its opinion does provide principles and considerations with ele-
ments from all of the definitions discussed above, suggesting that the term
crimination claims by ministers against their church, secular authorities would necessarily
intrude into church governance in a manner that would be inherently coercive, even if the
alleged discrimination were purely nondoctrinal”); see Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chi.,
934 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2019); Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 884 F.3d 416, 426–29 (2d
Cir. 2018); Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2018);
Fratello v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir. 2017); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520
F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2008); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 956–57
(9th Cir. 2004).
194 Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
195 In June 2015, Pope Francis proclaimed, using a quote popularly attributed to St.
Francis of Assisi, “Preach the Gospel always, and if necessary, use words!”  Pope Francis,
Homily at the Holy Mass and Blessing of the Sacred Palladium for the New Metropolitan
Archbishops on the Solemnity of Saints Peter and Paul, Apostles (June 29, 2015), http://
w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/homilies/2015/documents/papa-fran-
cesco_20150629_omelia-pallio.html.
196 Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 661; see also Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir.
2018), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 680 (2019) (mem.). But see Biel v. St. James Sch., 926 F.3d
1238, 1244 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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“minister” encompasses not only “the head of a religious congregation” but
also employees who “personify [the religious group’s] beliefs” or “preach
their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.”197  It proclaimed
that the Free Exercise Clause “protects a religious group’s right to shape its
own faith and mission through its appointments.”198
Some courts have embraced this totality-of-the-circumstances approach.
In Grussgott, the Seventh Circuit, after applying the four “factors” considered
in Hosanna-Tabor, concluded, “[I]t is fair to say that, under the totality of the
circumstances in this particular case, the importance of Grussgott’s role as a
‘teacher of [ ] faith’ to the next generation outweighed other considera-
tions.”199  Even prior to Hosanna-Tabor, courts had used similar multifactor
tests.200
However, there are problems with applying the general principles of
Hosanna-Tabor to other cases without the aid of a clear test.  Theoretically, all
mere followers of a religious group—including all employees—could be
expected to “personify its beliefs.”201  In addition, it may be argued that prac-
tically all church employees, from the pastor to the custodian, “minister” to
(i.e., attend to the needs of)202 the faithful.203  Surely a custodian serves the
congregation by ensuring the facilities are kept clean and stocked, even if he
or she does not lead a bible study.  It may also be argued that every mere
follower conveys the church’s message by preaching its beliefs, teaching its
faith, or carrying out its mission.  These general principles from a totality-of-
the-circumstances test easily broaden the definition of minister to encompass
every employee of a religious group.  Without an underlying specific defini-
tion of “minister,” the term is too ambiguous to be useful, especially given its
conflicting common usages.  A single clear definition is needed.
In addition, the looseness of a totality-of-the-circumstances test gives
courts broad discretion in its application, creating a risk of inconsistency and
bias.  Courts are able to pick and choose which circumstances and factors
they will emphasize, potentially disadvantaging nonmainstream religious
groups and leading to inconsistent results.
197 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188,
190, 196 (2012).
198 Id. at 188.
199 Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 661 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor,
565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring)).
200 See, e.g., Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175–77 (5th Cir. 1999).
201 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188; see, e.g., EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 780 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Hosanna-Tabor . . . charac-
terizes its staff members as ‘fine Christian role models’ . . . .”); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626
F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[F]aculty members are expected to serve as exemplars of
practicing Christians . . . .”).
202 See Minister, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002) (“To serve, perform the
function of a servant; to attend to the comfort or needs of another; to assist, be of
use . . . .”).
203 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194–95.
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Finally, and most importantly, courts are still put in the position of
deciding how important an employee’s role is to the mission of the religious
group.  This is essentially a religious question that is for the religious group
alone to decide.
These weaknesses illustrate that the Court must provide a clearer defini-
tion of “minister,” yet none of the definitions discussed above are sufficient
to protect the religious autonomy interests embodied in the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
E. Option 5: Deference to the Religious Group
Recognizing the problems inherent in tasking the court with deciding
what is essentially a religious question, Justice Thomas concluded that a civil
court must defer to the religious group in the determination of whether its
employee is a “minister.”  He asserted, “[T]he Religion Clauses require civil
courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious organiza-
tion’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”204  He
argued that in order for religious organizations to have “autonomy in matters
of internal governance, including the selection of those who will minister the
faith,” secular courts cannot “second-guess” their “sincere determination that
a given employee is a ‘minister’ under the organization’s theological ten-
ets.”205  He claimed deference is required because “[t]he question whether
an employee is a minister is itself religious in nature,” and creating a more
substantive test would create the risk of disadvantaging nonmainstream relig-
ious groups because a judge might not “understand [their] religious tenets
and sense of mission.”206
This view is supported, implicitly or explicitly, by other courts and even
Justice Alito in his concurrence.  When Justice Alito explained why it was
inappropriate for a civil court to inquire into whether a religious group’s
asserted reason for firing its minister was pretextual, he asserted:
The mere adjudication of . . . questions [regarding the importance of a relig-
ious doctrine] would pose grave problems for religious autonomy: It would
require calling witnesses to testify about the importance and priority of the
religious doctrine in question, with a civil factfinder sitting in ultimate judg-
ment of what the accused church really believes, and how important that
belief is to the church’s overall mission.207
Adjudication of the importance of the employee to the mission of a
religious group, which would involve a determination of religious doctrine,
poses the same problems.  This concern played out in Cannata.208  When the
Fifth Circuit investigated whether the church’s former music director had
been a “minister,” it evaluated “evidence” put forth by the church in support
204 Id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring).
205 Id. at 197.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 205–06 (Alito, J., concurring).
208 See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text.
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of its claim that musicians “carry[ ] out the Church’s mission.”209  The civil
court determined that music played an “important role . . . in the celebration
of Mass” and that therefore the music director did, too.210  These are clearly
evaluations of religious doctrine, which civil courts are barred from undertak-
ing under the Establishment Clause.  The religious importance of the roles of
aspects of worship, whether art or persons, are for religious groups, not civil
courts, to determine.211  The Seventh Circuit echoed this sentiment in the
context of the application of the term “minister” to a church organist:
If the Roman Catholic Church believes that organ music is vital to its relig-
ious services, and that to advance its faith it needs the ability to select organ-
ists, who are we judges to disagree?  Only by subjecting religious doctrine to
discovery and, if necessary, jury trial, could the judiciary reject a church’s
characterization of its own theology and internal organization.  Yet it is pre-
cisely to avoid such judicial entanglement in, and second-guessing of, relig-
ious matters that the Justices established the rule of Hosanna-Tabor.212
Deference to the religious group in the application of the term “minis-
ter” in the ministerial exception is essential.  What was missing from Justice
Thomas’s opinion, however, was a clear definition of “minister.”  He claimed
that “[j]udicial attempts to fashion a civil definition of ‘minister’ through a
bright-line test or multifactor analysis risk disadvantaging” nonmainstream
religious groups.213  However, without a definition, this legal term of art is
meaningless.  A religious group could not accurately determine whether its
employee is a “minister” without some guidance as to what that term means.
In addition, the First Amendment grants religious groups autonomy to
decide religious questions but not legal questions.
F. Option 6: Those Who Play a Role “of Substantial Religious Importance” as
Determined by the Religious Group
This Note argues that “minister” for purposes of the ministerial excep-
tion should be defined as any employee who plays a role “of substantial relig-
ious importance”214 within the organization.  This role may include
involvement in teaching the religious group’s tenets, conveying its message,
leading its worship or ceremonies, or otherwise furthering its mission, as
defined by the religious group.
209 See supra note 129.
210 Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 177–78 (5th Cir. 2012).
211 Cf. Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 619 (9th Cir. 2018) (Fisher, J., dissenting)
(“The courts may not evaluate the relative importance of a ministerial duty to a religion’s
overall mission or belief system.”).
212 Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 934 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2019).
213 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 197
(2012) (Thomas, J., concurring).
214 This phrase was taken from Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor. Id. at 200
(Alito, J., concurring).  Although he did not intend to use it as a test for “minister,” it is a
useful definition.
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Skeptics may be concerned that if civil courts defer to a religious group’s
determination, religious groups will unfairly take advantage of this protec-
tion.  One response to this valid concern is that this risk may be mitigated by
limiting deference, as Justice Thomas did, to determinations made by relig-
ious groups in good faith.215  If there are “sign[s] of subterfuge” indicating
the religious group is merely attempting to avoid a statutory obligation in its
determination, deference may not be appropriate.216  Although Justice
Thomas and multiple circuits have proposed this solution, it is difficult to see
how enforcing it will not cause the entanglement concerns the deferential
approach was meant to prevent.  An investigation into why a religious group
determined an employee played a role “of substantial religious importance”
would impermissibly entangle the government with religion as much as an
investigation into why the religious group fired the employee would.
Although a deferential approach incorporates a risk of abuse by religious
groups, this risk must be accepted, because the First Amendment prohibits
civil courts from second-guessing a religious group’s answers to religious
questions, and any application of the term “minister” in the ministerial
exception context will involve a religious question.  Religious groups’ legal
and moral obligations to tell the truth must be relied on to settle this
concern.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the full realization of the religious autonomy established
by the First Amendment requires a ministerial exception that precludes civil
courts from investigating employment discrimination claims by employees
whom a religious group has determined played a role “of substantial religious
importance” in furtherance of the religious group’s mission.  Since the nine-
teenth century, the Supreme Court has protected churches’ exclusive right to
make judgments involving church doctrine and governance.  The courts of
appeals have respected this principle of religious autonomy by building the
ministerial exception doctrine to protect the free exercise of religion and to
prevent excessive government entanglement with religion, and by applying
the doctrine to a variety of employees whom they deemed to be “ministers.”
The Hosanna-Tabor Court blessed the courts of appeals’ efforts by officially
adopting the ministerial exception, but the Court neglected to provide a
clear definition of the all-important term “minister.”  The courts of appeals,
215 See id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Religion Clauses require civil
courts . . . to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies
as its minister.”).
216 Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2018); see
Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (quoting Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir.
2006)) (“[I]f a church labels a person a religious official as a mere ‘subterfuge’ to avoid
statutory obligations, the ministerial exception does not apply.”); see also Tomic, 442 F.3d at
1039 (“[I]f to avoid having to pay the minimum wage to its janitor a church designated all
its employees ‘ministers,’ the court would treat the designation as a subterfuge.”).
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attempting to apply Hosanna-Tabor in subsequent cases, have used inconsis-
tent approaches to apply the term “minister” in the circumstances of each
case.  The Ninth Circuit has chosen to limit ministers to those employees who
are “leaders” of the religious group; the Second Circuit has chosen to focus
on the function of the employee; and the Seventh Circuit contemplates some
role for deference to a religious organization, at least in the determination of
which activities constitute a religious function.
As Justice Thomas argued, however, deference to religious groups in the
ministerial exception context is required by the Religion Clauses.  The
United States is home to a great variety of religious groups, not just those
who adhere to traditional Protestant doctrine and concepts of “minister.”
Some faiths, like Jehovah’s Witnesses and Catholicism, consider all their
members to be ministers.217  For this reason, a clear definition of “minister”
as a legal term of art is needed.  This Note’s proposed definition of “minis-
ter,” an employee who plays a role “of substantial religious importance” in
furthering the religious group’s mission, is sufficiently broad to protect all
religious groups yet sufficiently precise to give the term an identifiable mean-
ing.  This and any other definition of “minister” will incorporate concepts
such as “message” and “mission” and center on the religious importance of
the employee to the religious group.  Because the church itself defines its
message and mission, the civil courts must defer to the church’s determina-
tion of who spreads that message and carries out that mission.  Adjudication
of such questions by civil courts would inevitably require the courts to make
evaluations of religious doctrine, which the Religion Clauses prohibit them
from making.
Civil courts must defer to the religious group’s determination of
whether its employee served an important religious role.  Otherwise, civil
factfinders would be involved in the evaluation of religious doctrine, because
the religious importance of an employee’s role can only be determined by
the application of religious doctrine.  This government evaluation of relig-
ious doctrine would infringe on the religious group’s free exercise rights and
violate the Establishment Clause.  In its upcoming ministerial exception
cases, Biel and Our Lady of Guadalupe School, the Supreme Court should pro-
vide a clearer definition of “minister” and call for deference to a religious
group’s determination of which of its employees play a role “of substantial
religious importance.”
217 See Who Are God’s Ministers Today?, WATCHTOWER, Nov. 15, 2000, 15, 16, (“According
to the Bible, all Jehovah’s worshippers—heavenly and earthly—are ministers.”); U.S. CON-
FERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH
CARE SERVICES 6–7 (6th ed. 2018) (“By virtue of their Baptism, lay faithful are called to
participate actively in the Church’s life and mission.” (citing POPE JOHN PAUL II, CHRIS-
TIFIDELES LAICI no. 29 (1988))).
